Error of judgment
The European Court of Justice was wrong to weigh in on the definition of a human embryo.
T he question of when a formless clump of developing cells can truly be said to become a human will never have a clear answer. It depends on whom you ask: biologists, theologians, and prolife and pro-choice campaigners have all wrestled with the concept for years. Regulations that cover the relevant scientific fields and issues should take all these conflicting views into account. Not everybody will be happy with the outcome, but, by definition, not everybody can be.
In October, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) took on the unproven, nuclear-energy agency under the environment ministry. It has also promised to produce its own independent report on the accident, but its workings are far from transparent. Japan should go further and open broader and more permanent channels for scientific advice. Fukushima should be the incident that finally forces the government to put in place a structure that could bring fast and decisive action on critical situations in the future. Japan could start by following the example of countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and take on a science adviser. Five years ago, Japan did claim to establish such a system, installing a scientist as a special adviser to the cabinet (see Nature 443, 734-735; 2006) . But that was based more on hopes of encouraging innovation than dealing with the broad range of scientific issues that a proper science adviser takes on -and the experiment lasted only two years. Now there is no science adviser. Efforts to give the Science Council of Japan a more influential role, akin to the US National Academy of Sciences, have also come up short (see Nature 428, 357; 2004) .
Scientists can help to understand what is known and, critically, what cannot be known about a situation. In the absence of certainty, they can help to understand the risks involved. They can help to explain this cogently and clearly to people at large. They can do this from an unbiased and apolitical perspective, so that even if circumstances change they can change their assessment with less risk of being criticized for political motives. And they give the politicians both cover for unpopular decisions and, in the case of a political appointee such as an adviser, a trusted personal relationship.
Japan can do better. The Japanese people deserve better. ■ M ore than nine months after the nuclear-reactor disaster at Fukushima, fundamental questions about what happened remain unanswered. Without answers to these questions, Japan, and the rest of the world, is in the dark on what went wrong, what must be done now, and how to avoid similar accidents in future.
A Comment in this week's issue summarizes these concerns (see page 313). For the Japanese public, one of the most troubling things about the article should be the identity of its authors: two ruling party politicians, including a former prime minister. Surely they should be able to get some answers?
Following the accident, the Tokyo Electric Power Company, which operated the Fukushima plant, initially released only a heavily redacted nuclear-reactor manual. When finally released in an undoctored format in late October, the manual revealed just how lacking the company was in terms of contingency measures. This concealment gives some idea of why even senior political figures struggled for answers in the wake of the disaster, and why they have now chosen to pose their questions in this very public way.
This all points to a problem in Japan that predates Fukushima and seems to afflict every Japanese regime: the absence of a strong and independent scientific voice to advise the government. In this case, such a voice -be it from a chief scientist appointed by the government or from a truly independent nuclear regulator -could have helped to direct evacuations, medical relief, screening for radiation and decontamination efforts. It also would have helped to lead the studies needed to find answers to the questions mentioned above.
Many times in Japan's recent history, the government has handed responsibility for dealing with issues involving tricky scientific concepts to bureaucrats or politicians. All too often, these officials, not understanding the issues, do what governments shouldn't do -hide the problem and hope it will go away. In the meantime, politicians fumble for answers, while ill-informed government spokespeople tell confused stories that can make them look foolish, irresponsible or deceitful. This is how the government handled Minamata disease caused by industrial mercury poisoning in the 1950s and 60s, the HIV-tainted blood products problem in the 1980s, and the BSE scare of a decade ago. And now it is how it has handled Fukushima. Fear of spreading panic, for example, prevented warnings being issued on the dangers of radiation predicted by simulations. As a result, more residents than necessary were exposed.
The government's main sources for scientific information for Fukushima were the industry ministry's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Nuclear Safety Commission. Although these bodies might have expertise in nuclear-reactor physics, they also have ties to the nuclear industry that create a conflict of interest. And they were not an effective and prompt source for quick decisions on decontamination or health risks. The government recognized this by shifting nuclear monitoring and safety regulation functions to a new, as yet 
The mask slips
The Durban meeting shows that climate policy and climate science inhabit parallel worlds. I t says a lot about the outcome of the UN climate talks in South Africa at the weekend that most of the immediate reports focused on the wrangling that led to an agreement of sorts, rather than the contents and implications of the agreement itself. Late-night talks, later-night arguments and early-morning pacts between battling negotiators with the apparent fate of the world resting on their shoulders give the process a melodrama that is hard to resist, particularly for those who experienced it first hand in the chaos of the Durban meeting (see page 299).
Such late finishes are becoming the norm at these summits. Only as nations abandon their original negotiating positions and reveal their true demands -throwing international differences into stark relief -does a sense of urgency develop and serious negotiation take place. Combined with the consensus nature of the talks, which demands that everyone agrees to everything, the result is usually a cobbled-together compromise that allows as many countries as possible to claim victory and, most importantly, provides them with a mandate to reconvene in 12 months' time.
So it was this time. In the search for a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, we now have the Durban Platform, which comes on the heels of the Bali Road Map and the Copenhagen Accord.
It takes a certain kind of optimism -or an outbreak of collective Stockholm syndrome -to see the Durban outcome as a significant breakthrough on global warming, as many are claiming. Outside Europe -which has set itself binding emissions goals over the short and long term beyond what it will inherit under its stated plan to carry on with unilateral cuts under an extended Kyoto -there will be no obligation for any nation to reduce soaring greenhouse-gas emissions much before the end of the decade. And that is assuming that all flows smoothly in future UN talks, and that a global deal with binding commitments proves easier to find in talks due to start in 2015 than it has so far.
The Durban deal may mark a success in the political process to tackle climate change, but for the climate itself, it is an unqualified disaster. It is clear that the science of climate change and the politics of climate change, which claims to represent it, now inhabit parallel worlds.
This has always been true up to a point, but surely the mask of political rhetoric has now slipped so far, to reveal the ugly political reality underneath, that it can never be replaced. How can politicians talk now with a straight face of limiting global warming to 2 °C? How will campaigners frame this result as leaving yet another 'last chance' to save the planet?
That does not make the political process redundant -far from it. Introducing policies to curb emissions was never about saving the planet or not, or stopping global warming or not. It is about damage limitation -the 3 °C or 4 °C of average warming the planet could experience in the long term, according to some analyses of the Durban outcome doing the rounds, is clearly much worse than the 2 °C used as shorthand for dangerous at present. But it is preferable to the 5 °C or 6 °C that science suggests is possible if emissions continue to rise unabated.
To prevent that outcome will be just as difficult politically as was the now abandoned attempt to find a global successor in time to follow Kyoto. But it remains possible -and there were at least encouraging signs in Durban that previously obstinate countries recognize that it is necessary, even if it is delayed. Those, including this journal, who have long argued the scientific case for the need to control greenhouse-gas emissions should back this new political mood to the hilt. But as the Durban Platform crowds with politicians, the climate train they wait for has left the station. ■ question. And rather than tip-toeing around the sensitivities, the judges of the court -the highest in Europe -trampled right through them. The ECJ had been asked by the German Supreme Court to clarify ambiguous wording in the European Union (EU) directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, which bans patents on procedures that use human embryos. The ECJ responded with a clumsy ruling that outlaws patents involving stem cells derived from such embryos and, some critics say, raises questions about future research into regenerative medicine (see page 310). In doing so, the court effectively stepped over the line that separates the interpretation of law, which is its responsibility, from the creation of law, which is the job of parliaments and governments. For the most part, the ECJ does a faultless job. This time, however, it exceeded its competence. In the case under consideration, Greenpeace had claimed that the existing directive should outlaw a patent relying on human embryonic stem cells that had been taken out by Oliver Brüstle, director of the Institute of Reconstructive Neuro biology in Bonn, Germany. But are human embryonic stem cells equivalent to human embryos in this context? The German Supreme Court, which was handling the Greenpeace complaint, passed the question up to the ECJ.
Unfortunately, the ECJ chose not to confine its analysis to the patent context, but took it upon itself to define the term 'human embryo' generally (and in the broadest possible way), and to assess the surrounding moral environment. A human embryo, it said, comprises an ovum activated to divide by fertilization or any artificial means. Moreover, it added, any research involving human embryonic stemcell lines is immoral, because such cell lines are originally derived from fertilized eggs.
The ruling left many scientists, judges and legal experts in Germany and other EU member states fuming. Not only because the court had issued a de facto legal definition of a human embryo, but because it had done so with shoddy reasoning and without appropriate legal references. In the case of ambiguous law, a court should go back and ponder the intention of the law-makers. From its brief justification in Brüstle v. Greenpeace, the ECJ seems not to have done that. The ECJ is made up of judges from each EU member state, and critics argue that it simply does not have the technical expertise to deal with issues such as patenting, or stem cells. Yet the court is not held to account by any external watchdog, and its decisions cannot be appealed.
Last week, an alliance of ten major German research organizations, including the German Research Foundation (DFG, the country's national granting agency), the University Rectors Conference and the Max Planck Society, put out a statement condemning the decision. But the damage has been done. Battle lines have already been drawn in the European Parliament, with those opposed to research with human embryonic stem cells calling for funds to be frozen.
The only obvious route out of the confusion created by the ECJ is for the real law-makers -the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union -to amend the ambiguous EU directive that caused all the trouble. They should tighten its loose language on the legal definition of a human embryo in terms of patenting, so that the law reflects what the lawmakers originally intended. This will take courage (and time -the original directive was a decade in the works) but, as the ECJ ruling shows, for all its sensitivities, this is not a subject on which it pays to be vague. ■ "The ruling left many scientists, judges and legal experts in EU member states fuming."
